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Ricci's "Color-Blind" Standard in a Race Conscious
Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences?
MichaelJ. Zimmer*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ricci v. DeStefano,' the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Kennedy, ruled as a matter of law that the City of New
Haven had committed intentional disparate treatment
discrimination. The City had violated Title VII2 by deciding not to
use the results of a test given to promote firefighters to openings as
lieutenants and captains.' Plaintiffs were seventeen whites and one
Hispanic who would have been promoted if the test results were
used. The City defended its decision by asserting that it acted to
avoid Title VII disparate impact liability to African-American and
Hispanic test takers who would not be promoted if the test scores
were used.
Because the Court found a conflict between disparate treatment
law and disparate impact law-a conflict that had not previously
existed-it created a defense to a disparate treatment claim based on
disparate impact law. To rely on the potential disparate impact
liability as a defense to disparate treatment liability, the defendant
would have to prove that it had a "strong basis in evidence" that it
would be liable for disparate impact discrimination. Despite finding
* Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago; Professor of Law Emeritus, Seton
Hall University. My thanks to Charlie Sullivan and Rebecca Hanner White for all they have
taught me about employment discrimination law. The input from participants at Faculty
Workshops at Northwestern law school and the University of Georgia law school have proved
to be especially useful as this article was being developed. Allen Kamp, Mayer Freed, John
McGinnis, and Charlie Sullivan were especially helpful. Thanks to Loyola University Chicago
law school for its research funding and other support. Finally, thanks to Margaret L. Moses for
all her help in too many ways to mention.
1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
3. The Court reversed summary judgment for the defendants and, in an unusual move,
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. To do that, it had to find that no material issues
of fact existed and so plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That makes the
careful analysis of the opinion in light of facts the Court found indisputably true and sufficient
to support its decision extremely important.
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that it faced a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the
Court found as a matter of law that the City had failed to prove it
had that strong basis in evidence that it would have violated the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII if it had used the test scores
for promotions. The decision has already drawn significant and
interesting commentary.'
This Article will principally focus on the threshold issue of
disparate treatment law, to which the Court paid little attention,
rather than on the disparate impact issues on which the Court
devoted most of its opinion. The thesis of this Article is that it is
possible that a conservative majority of the Supreme Court
4. See Barbara Jean D'Acquila, A Management Employment Lawyer's Perspective on
Ricci v. DeStefano, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 213 (2010) (highlighting the challenge facing
employers and their lawyers because of Ricci); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon,
Reading Ricci: White(ning) Discrimination, Race-ing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV
(forthcoming 2010), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1507344 (undertaking a deep and
thorough investigation of the case to demonstrate that antidiscrimination law no longer
provides a level playing field for minority plaintiffs because the law grants white plaintiffs
significant advantages); Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court's 2008-2009
Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 253 (2009) (using Ricci as a
prime example of the "procedural extremism" of the Court by reversing summary judgment
for defendant and granting it to the plaintiffs); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate
Impact, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1341 (2010) (desribing Ricci as at least a partial step toward a
"color-blind" standard for both Title VII disparate treatment law and constitutional equal
protection law); Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, The New Disparate Impact, 90
B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564244
(developing what they see as an emerging employer affirmative defense to a disparate impact
case based on its good faith when it took an action that has been challenged); Kerri Stone, The
Unexpected Appearance of Transferred Intent in Title VII, 55 LoY. L. REv. 751 (2010)
(exploring ways to think about the new approach that finds liability for action taken "because
of race" in a general sense that is not directed at the particular plaintiffs adversely affected and
placing the decision in a procedural context by viewing it as an expansion of the doctrine of
"transferred intent" or "third party standing"); Michael Subit, A Plaintiffs' Employment
Lawyer's Perspective on Ricci v. DeStefano, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199 (2010)
(acknowledging that the "majority took a very expansive view of disparate treatment" in Ricci,
and arguing that it is actually bad for minority employees because it is a precursor to finding
the disparate impact provisions of Title VII to violate equal protection); Charles Sullivan, Ricci
v. DeStefano: End of the Line orJust Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 Nw. U.
L. REv. COLLOQUOY 201 (2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2009/40/LRColl2009n4Sullivan.pdf (analyzing the effect Ricci has on the
disparate impact doctrine and the relationship between disparate impact and disparate
treatment and suggesting the need for Congressional amendments to Title VII to overturn
Ricci); Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538525 (discussing Ricci in context with the
background development of the disparate impact doctrine); Howard Wasserman, Ricci Glitch,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Jul. 6, 2009, 6:46 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2009/07/ricci-glitch.html.
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inadvertently created new arguments for civil rights advocates
representing women and minority group men, the groups for whose
protection antidiscrimination statutes were enacted in the first
instance. The palpable empathy the majority felt for the Ricci
plaintiffs may have caused a majority of the Court to leap to a
finding of discrimination as a matter of law, thereby transforming
disparate treatment law to now make it easier for all plaintiffs to
prove their cases.
In short, the Court appears to have established essentially a
"color-blind" standard of disparate treatment liability for Title VII.5
A "color-blind" standard requires that an employer not know the
racial consequences of the employment actions it takes. The violation
of the "color-blind" standard leads to disparate treatment liability if
the plaintiff proves that (1) the defendant knew the racial
consequences of its decision, (2) it then made that decision in light
of that knowledge, thus making the decision "because of race," and
(3) the plaintiff suffered the effect of an adverse employment action.
The Court accepted that the City's motivation for its action was
benevolent in the sense that it was taken to avoid disparate impact
liability to minority group test takers. In other words, the City
decided not to use the test scores "because of' the effect their use
would have on African-American and Hispanic test takers. The fact
that the City was assumed to have acted benevolently as to some of
the members of all three racial groups affected-or at least members
of the two minority groups affected-was irrelevant to liability to a
different group, the Ricci plaintiffs, which included one minority
group member. The defendant was liable to these plaintiffs who were
adversely affected by the decision even though the decision was
made in spite of their race, not because of it.'
5. The Court indicated that equal protection constitutional principles provide guidance
in the Title VII context. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675. Richard Primus further develops the point
that this same standard applies to the constitutional law of equal protection as well as Title VII
disparate treatment. See Primus, supra note 4, at 1344.
6. In creating this new test of disparate treatment discrimination, Justice Kennedy did
recognize one exception where an employer shows that at the time it took action knowing its
racial consequences it was in the design phase for an employment policy or practice, before it
had been finalized for use. See discussion infra notes 67-71. The Court also gave some
emphasis, if not making it an element of the Ricci "color-blind" test, to the reliance interests
of the Ricci plaintiffs and their expectation that the test results would be used. It may be that
the discussion about these plaintiffs' reliance efforts and their expectation that the test scores
would be used is more relevant to the third element of the new test-that the plaintiffs suffered
an adverse employment action-than to the showing of intent to discriminate. See discussion
1259
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Part II describes the three different racial groups, with members
of each racial group being represented in two groups depending on
the outcome of the City's decision not to use the test. Some
members of each racial group would be favored if the test scores
were not used, and some would be favored if the test results were
used. In other words, all the test takers can be divided into six
different groups depending on their race and on the effect the
decision not to use the test scores for promotions had on them.
Because the Court did not expressly adopt a "color-blind" test
for disparate treatment liability, Part III sets out and tries to analyze
what Justice Kennedy did say which, when all put together, supports
the conclusion that the Court has adopted a "color-blind" standard
that substantially broadens the scope of application of disparate
treatment law. In doing so, the Court appeared to overturn prior
disparate treatment law that had made it difficult for plaintiffs to
prove their cases. Part IV fleshes out the elements of this new, Ricci
"color-blind" basis for disparate treatment liability, while Part V
discusses two subsequent claims against the City of New Haven now
that the results of the test have been used to promote firefighters to
lieutenant and captain openings. Part VI shows how this new, Ricci
"color-blind" standard can be used to advance the general
antidiscrimination agenda. Part VII sketches some of the broader
potential impacts of Ricci in terms of equal protection law. Part VIII
concludes the Article.
II. RiccPs THREE RACIAL GROUPS, EACH INCLUDING THOSE
WHO WOULD BE PROMOTABLE AND THOSE WHO WOULD NOT BE
PROMOTED
Because Justice Kennedy does not explicitly adopt a "color-
blind" standard, understanding the change that the Court made to
disparate treatment law requires careful analysis of the opinion and
the facts that it found to support its conclusion that the City
committed disparate treatment discrimination as a matter of law.
Justice Kennedy begins by describing the outcome of the test in
terms of its impact on the test takers who were members of the three
different racial groups:
infra notes 51-65.
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Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination-
43 whites, 19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates
passed-25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Eight lieutenant
positions were vacant at the time of the examination. As the rule of
three operated, this meant that the top 10 candidates were eligible
for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white.
Subsequent vacancies would have allowed at least 3 black
candidates to be considered for promotion to lieutenant.
Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination- 2 5
whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed
-16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Seven captain positions
were vacant at the time of the examination. Under the rule of
three, 9 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to
captain-7 whites and 2 Hispanics.
Thus, the test scores had an impact on three different racial
groups-whites, Hispanics, and African Americans-with members
of each racial group represented among those who would be
advantaged, either by being promoted or at least promotable, if the
test results were used as well as in the group of those who could not
be promoted if the test scores were used.
Looking at the racial consequences flowing from the
administration of the tests, there were six different groups:
1. The 24 lower scoring African Americans who, if the City
decided not to use the test scores, would have an improved
chance for promotion if some alternative method were used
to make the promotions. With no chance for promotion if
7. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665 (citations omitted). The "rule of three" is common in civil
service systems. It means that the employer is limited to selecting one of the top three scorers
on the test and cannot take someone with a lower score. The Court held that as a matter of
law the tests resulted in a disparate impact looking only at the pass rates, which did not tell the
whole story of that impact since simply passing the test would not necessarily lead to
promotion during the two year life span for using the tests:
The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that
the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate -impact liability. On the
captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent
for both black and Hispanic candidates. On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for
white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for
Hispanic candidates, 20 percent. The pass rates of minorities . . . were approximately
one-half the pass rates for white candidates . ...
Id. at 2677-78. The E.E.O.C. has an 80% rule of thumb to determine whether disparate
impact exists. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (D) (2008) (selection rate that is less than 80% "of the
rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact").
1261
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the test results were used, any alternative would likely
improve their prospects. But how much those prospects
would improve would depend on what alternative promotion
procedures would be used.
2. The 20 lower scoring Hispanic test takers who, like the 24
African-American test takers in group 1, would not have
been promoted if the tests scores were used.
3. The 51 lower scoring white test takers who would not be
promoted if the test scores would be used. Like the African-
American and Hispanic test takers in groups 1 and 2, their
chances for promotion improved by the City's decision not
to use the test scores because they had no chance for
promotion if the test scores were used.
4. The 17 white test takers who did score high enough to be
promoted if the test scores were used. With the decision not
to use the test scores, their chances for promotion declined.
They lost what appeared to be a sure thing. As a result of the
City's decision, they would have some chance for promotion
under whatever system the City would decide to use for
promotions instead of the test scores.
5. The 2 Hispanic test takers who scored high enough to be
promoted if the test scores were used. Like the members of
group 4, they have a reduced chance of promotion because
they lost a sure thing.
6. The 3 African-American test takers who might have a chance
of promotion if the test results were used and if there were
more openings over the two-year life span for the use of the
test results. With the decision not to use the test scores, their
chances for promotion probably would decline but it would
be unknown until alternative promotion procedures were
established.
Table 1 shows the results as to all six groups:
Table 1: Outcome by Racial Groups of Test
Whites Blacks Hispanics TOTAL
Promotable 17 3 2 22
Not Promotable 51 24 20 95
TOTAL 68 27 22 117
1262
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The outcomes in terms of promotable or possibly promotable
test takers if the test results were used would be that 25% of the
white test takers would be promoted, as would 11.1% of the African
Americans and 9% of the Hispanics. The Hispanic rate was a little
more than one-third of the white rate and the African-American rate
was less than half of the white rate. It is no wonder that the Court
found that the test results would, as a matter of law, have a disparate
impact on minority test takers.
Table 2 shows the rates of promotion for the three groups and
then compares the promotion rates of the African-American and
Hispanic test takers to the promotion rate of the white test takers,
the group that had the highest rate of promotion.
Table 2: Comparative Rates of Promotion
Rate of Promotion Percentage of White
Rate
White 25%
African American 11.1% 44.4%
Hispanic 9% 36%
Once the racial impact of this test became known to the City and
the community-both as to the pass rate and its actual effect on the
different racial groups'-the use of the scores became a hotly
contested political issue.
When the examination results showed that white candidates had
outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local
politicians opened a public debate that turned rancorous. Some
firefighters argued the tests should be discarded because the results
showed the tests to be discriminatory. They threatened a
discrimination lawsuit if the City made promotions based on the
tests. Other firefighters said the exams were neutral and fair. And
they, in turn, threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City, relying
on the statistical racial disparity, ignored the test results and denied
promotions to the candidates who had performed well. In the end
the City took the side of those who protested the test results. It
8. The identity of the individual test takers was not known to those engaged in the
political debate or to the test takers themselves. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
1263
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threw out the examinations.9
Based on these facts, Justice Kennedy held that, as a matter of
law, the City had engaged in disparate treatment discrimination, that
is, intentional discrimination against the plaintiffs.'o
III. RIcci's SIX STATEMENTS THAT ADOPT A "COLOR-BLIND"
DISPARATE TREATMENT STANDARD
The most significant question is why these facts support, as a
matter of law, a finding of disparate treatment discrimination against
these particular test takers-the 17 white and one Hispanic test
takers-all of whom would be promoted if the tests results were
used. That group did not include all of those who would be
promoted or be promotable if the test results were used. Further, the
Court did not point to any other evidence that the City's decision
was taken because of the race of these particular test takers. The
answer the Court gave can be found by analyzing six separate
statements that indicate why the City's conduct amounted to
disparate treatment discrimination. It is the thesis of this Article that,
taken together, these statements mean that the Court has adopted a
new, "color-blind" standard of disparate treatment liability. Because
the "color-blind" standard was not explicitly adopted, the holding
and the text of the Court's opinion has to be parsed rather carefully,
quote-by-quote, to unpack its potential meaning for disparate
treatment law.
First, and perhaps most important, the Court found that the City
had committed disparate treatment discrimination as a matter of law,
even though the City's action was found as a matter of law to be
motivated by its desire to avoid disparate impact liability. In finding
disparate treatment discrimination to exist, the Court had to deal
with the conflict created between an employer's obligation to avoid
both disparate treatment and disparate impact liability. This conflict
had not previously been judicially recognized." Under the
9. Id. at 2664.
10. That finding set the stage for the Court's extensive analysis of the facts in the record
to support its finding that the City did not have a "strong basis in evidence" that it would be
liable under disparate impact law if it used the test scores. While it created the "strong basis in
evidence" defense to a disparate treatment claim, the Court held that, as a matter of law, the
City did not satisfy that test. Id. at 2676-77.
11. The closest the Court has gotten to the issue arose in Los Angeles Department of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), a disparate treatment case challenging a
1264
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preexisting understanding, an employer was prohibited from acting
with intent to discriminate-disparate treatment discriminationl-as
well as prohibited from using an employment practice that caused a
disparate impact on groups protected by Title VII unless the practice
had been justified as job related and consistent with business
necessity.' Simply knowing the racial consequences of an
employment action did not constitute acting with intent to
discriminate. As long as the employer did not act with intent to
discriminate, an employer could act knowing the racial consequences
of its actions and thereby also avoid disparate impact liability."
The premise of Ricci is that acting with such knowledge is acting
with intent to discriminate at least to a prima facie level. After Ricci,
an employer could avoid both disparate treatment and disparate
impact liability only where its action was justified by a "strong basis
in evidence" that it would be liable for disparate impact
discrimination if it failed to take account of race in making its
retirement plan rule requiring women to contribute a higher percentage of their pay to the
plan in order to get monthly retirement benefits equal to men's benefits. In defense of this
discriminatory policy, the defendant argued that a gender neutral pension plan would result in
disparate impact discrimination against men because, as a group, they would receive less
retirement income than women because of their group's shorter life expectancy. In a footnote,
the Court avoided deciding whether or not there was a conflict between disparate treatment
and disparate impact theories. "[E]ach retiree's total pension benefits are ultimately
determined by his actual life span," so that differences in total benefits received by retirees was
because of their actual life spans and not because of sex. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710 n.20.
Further, even though such a neutral practice will inevitably have "some disproportionate
impact on one group or another," Griggs v. Duke Power Co. "does not imply . . . that
discrimination must always be inferred from such consequences." Id. Subsequently, in
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1980), the Court decided that the fact that, at the bottom
line, the employer's selection process did not result in disparate impact against minority group
members in general did not prevent employees affected by a particular element of the process
that did produce an adverse impact from challenging that element.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
13. Id. § 2000e-2(k).
14. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 315 (9th ed. 2008):
[D]isparate treatment is not allowed because discriminatory intent is not a
permissible basis for denying employment opportunities to individuals in our
society; but even a nondiscriminatory motivation will not save practices that are not
justified by business necessity and have the effect of falling more harshly on a
protected group. So stated, disparate treatment and disparate impact principles seem
to work in conjunctions to achieve the basic goal of Title VII.
Id. This assumes that simply knowing the racial consequences of an action does not establish
the intent to discriminate element of a disparate treatment case.
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decision. 5 In other words, acting with knowledge of the action's
racial consequences to take account of potential disparate impact
liability constitutes disparate treatment discrimination without
having that strong basis in evidence that it would be liable.
As will be developed, the finding that a conflict existed between
the obligations on employers to commit neither disparate treatment
nor disparate impact discrimination could be based only on the fact
that the City knew the racial consequences of its decision when it
made it. The City knew the effect its decision would have on all the
test takers in all three racial groups. Its motive for not using the test
scores was because of the race of lower scoring members of the
minority groups. Yet, the Court found this to be "because of [the]
race" of the higher scoring test takers, which included members of
all three racial groups.' 6 Thus, the best way to understand Ricci is
that acting with knowledge of a particular decision's racial
consequences is disparate treatment discrimination because it violates
a new "color-blind" standard of disparate treatment liability.
Second, the following six statements made in the opinion do not
expressly adopt a "color-blind" standard of disparate treatment
liability. They, nevertheless, lead ineluctably to the conclusion that
what the City did that constituted disparate treatment discrimination
was to act with knowledge of the racial consequences of its decision
not to use the test results because that action had an adverse affect
on some test takers who would have been promoted if the test scores
had been used.
The six statements that are key to understanding Ricci were set
out in two groups of three. The first three come early in the
discussion of what law applies to these facts and form the core
findings that establish that there is now a "color-blind" standard of
disparate treatment discrimination. The statements in the second set
15. A basis for the Court's rejection of the City's good faith in making the decision and
its requirement that the City have a strong basis in evidence that it would be liable under the
disparate impact theory may have been the Court's fear that a good faith standard for resolving
the conflict between disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination would too readily
allow an employer to resort to the use of racial quotas. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
adverts to the quota issue. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682.
16. Professor Stone analyzes this aspect of Ricci as the Court expanding the concept of
"transferred intent"-the intent of the City's action, because of the race of the lower scoring
minority test takers, was transferred to become an intent to discriminate against the Ricci
plaintiffs. Alternatively, she describes the case as expanding the "third party standing" doctrine.
See Stone, supra note 4.
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appear toward the end of the opinion. The first of that set
summarizes the essence of this new standard-the "color-blind"
standard. The second in that set explores the reliance or expectancy
interests of the test takers to emphasize the seriousness of the harm
caused by the City's conduct. The final statement develops an
exception to the "color-blind" standard of liability for employers
who know the racial consequences of proposed employment
practices during the design phase of those practices.
1. All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not
to certify the examination results because of the
statistical disparity based on race-i.e., how minority
candidates had performed when compared to white
candidates. As the District Court put it, the City
rejected the test results because "too many whites
and not enough minorities would be promoted were
the lists to be certified." . . . Without some other
justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking
violates Title VII's command that employers cannot
take adverse employment actions because of an
individual's race.17
This first statement finds as fact that, before it acted, the City
knew the distribution of test scores by racial groups, including the
fact that there was adverse impact on minority test takers when
compared to white test takers. It knew that the promotion rate for
the group of white test takers was much higher than the rates for the
Hispanic and African-American test takers: The Hispanic promotion
rate was 36% of the rate for white test takers and the African-
American promotability rate was 44% of the white rate. Thus, the
17. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673 (citations omitted). In essence the City was replacing the
test scores, which on the surface at least, were achieved in a "color-blind" way, with a decision
not to use the test scores, which also on the surface at least, were achieved in a "color-blind"
way: All members of all three racial groups were treated the same way since none of their test
scores would be used for good or bad. What is different about Ricci and a situation where the
employer cancelled the test because it learned that security had been breached when the test
was administered? All of the test takers would be treated the same as all of the test takers in
Ricci but it would be doubtful anyone would claim it was because of the race of any particular
group of test takers. In Ricci, all the test takers were treated the same but the Court found that
the City intended to discriminate against some of the test takers because of their race while
others of the same and other races were also adversely affected by the decision.
1267
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Ricci plaintiffs established that the City was conscious of the
consequences for the members of all three racial groups when it
decided not to use the test scores. In essence, this confirms that the
City knew that there would be a significant disparate impact on
minority group members if the test results were used and that some
test takers of all three races would not be promoted if the test scores
were not used.'" Saying that this "express, race-based
decisionmaking" is disparate treatment comes as close as the Court
gets to articulating explicitly a "color-blind" standard.
2. Whatever the City's ultimate aim-however well intentioned
or benevolent it might have seemed-the City made its
employment decision because of race.'
This statement drops from the case any issue or evidence of
animus, prejudice or other motivation aimed at hurting the Ricci
plaintiffs or, indeed, any of the test takers. Nevertheless, even
without any evidence of animus or intent to discriminate against the
Ricci plaintiffs, the decision by the City still was characterized as
"because of race." With no animus or other evidence of ill will
toward anyone, the "because of race" could only be based on the
fact that the City knew the racial effect its decision would have on all
the test takers of all three racial groups, some of whom would benefit
and some of whom would not if the test results were used. When the
City acted with that knowledge, it was "because of race" in the
abstract sense that the racial consequences of the action were known.
But there was no evidence that the City focused in a negative way on
the race of any individuals or of the members of any racial group. No
one was treated differently because of their race, whether majority or
minority. The Court found that the decision was "because of race"
but not "because of" the race of the plaintiffs. In other words,
"because of race" means an action that violates a "color-blind"
standard.
This is a substantial change in disparate treatment law. Before
Ricci, proof that an actor was simply conscious of the race or gender
18. See 29 C.F.R §§ 1607, 1607.4(D).
19. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674. So, the City acted "because of" the race of those minority
test takers who did not score highly enough to be promoted or be promotable and not
"because of" the race of those test takers, including members of all three racial groups, who
did score highly enough.
1268
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of the affected individuals would not support drawing an inference of
the intent to discriminate, the most difficult element in a claim of
disparate treatment discrimination. 20 For example, justice O'Connor,
in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 1 made it
clear that intent to discriminate could not be found solely on the fact
that the race or gender of the person affected by the decision is
known to the decisionmaker:
Race and gender always "play a role" in ... the benign sense
that these are human characteristics of which decisionmakers
are aware and about which they may comment in a perfectly
neutral and non-discriminatory fashion. For example, . . .
mere reference to "a lady candidate" might show that gender
"played a role" in the decision, but by no means could
support a rational factfinder's inference that the decision was
made "because of' sex.22
After Ricci, it can be argued that the only factual basis for the
Court's determination that the City's action in deciding not to use
the test results was "because of race" was simply that it acted
knowing the racial consequences-the effect on all of the white,
African-American, and Hispanic test takers-of that decision. Acting
to avoid negative consequences to some minority group test takers
made the decision "because of [the] race" of others, the 17 white
and one Hispanic plaintiffs plus another Hispanic test taker who
would be promoted if the test scores were used and three African-
American test takers who might be promoted over the useful life of
the test. While Price Waterhouse involved a situation where the
decisionmakers knew the gender of an individual candidate for
partnership, Ricci involved a larger group but it is not clear why that
would make a difference in the analysis. After all, in Price
Waterhouse, the gender of all of the candidates considered for
partnership was known to the group making partnership decisions,
though a discrimination case was brought by only one of them, Ann
20. Under prior law, an individual disparate treatment case required proof of three
elements: (1) defendant's intent to discriminate; (2) plaintiff suffering an adverse employment
action; and (3) joining defendant's intent to discriminate to the adverse employment action
plaintiff suffered, with that last linkage element proved either to the "but-for" level or to "a
motivating factor" level. For a full development of those elements, see Michael J. Zimmer, A
Chain ofInferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1243 (2008).
21. 490 U.S. 228 (1988).
22. Id. at 277.
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Hopkins. Based on the evidence the Court refers to in Ricci, it
applies this new, "color-blind" standard of what constitutes disparate
treatment to find liability when a decisionmaker knows the racial
consequences of an action that it takes. Anyone adversely affected by
a decision made under such circumstances would be able to bring an
action for disparate treatment discrimination.
Unlinking liability from any showing that the employer focused
on the race of those affected helps explain why the Court found
disparate treatment against the 17 white and one Hispanic who were
the Ricci plaintiffs, without regard to the fact that those adversely
affected included members of two different racial groups.23 It is
reduced to a simple, straightforward case determined by whether or
not the defendant knew the race of those affected by the decision
and whether or not at least one person was adversely affected by the
defendant's decision.
Putting together the first two statements, there is disparate
treatment discrimination when an employer acts with knowledge of
how different racial groups would be affected since acting with that
knowledge, even if motivated by a desire to avoid harm to some
members of two racial groups, makes the decision "because of race"
of some of the members of all three racial groups.
If the decisonmaker knew the race of those affected by its action,
whether positively or negatively, the employer is liable unless it had a
sufficient justification for its disparate treatment. This is an extreme
standard but is consistent with what Richard Primus calls his
"general reading" of Ricci.2 4 From the viewpoint of civil rights
plaintiffs, this new standard would make it much easier than under
the preexisting law to establish disparate treatment liability: Evidence
that the decisionmaker knew the racial consequences in general of its
action suffices to establish liability if the plaintiff was adversely
affected by the action, even if there was no evidence that the action
was taken "because of' the race of that plaintiff. Liability would be
established even if the action was taken in spite of the plaintiffs race
because it was taken to benefit the members of the same as well as
the other racial groups.2 5
23. Another Hispanic, who did not join the Ricci action, also lost his immediate
promotion when the City decided not to use the test and three African Americans lost the
chance to be promoted during the period in which the test results would be used.
24. Primus, supra note 4, at 1363.
25. Evidence that the decisionmaker was not "color-blind" is not necessary to proving
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3. The City rejected the test results solely because the higher
scoring candidates were white. 6
This statement is intriguing for its finding that the action of the
City was "solely because the higher scoring candidates were white."27
The word "solely" gives one pause since there is no evidence that the
City acted other than because it knew all the scores as they affected
the members of all three racial groups and acted to avoid adversely
affecting the members of the two minority groups. As the Court
acknowledged, it inevitably follows from the City's announced
reason for not using the test scores-the test results would cause a
disparate impact on minority group members-that the City also
knew that the white candidates, as a group, scored higher. Because a
disparate impact showing by its nature is a comparison of outcomes
between two racial groups,28 the facts here would also just as readily
support a finding that the City acted "solely" because the scores of
minority test takers taken as groups were too low when compared
with the scores of the group of white test takers.29 That, of course, is
the explanation the City claimed was the basis of its decision not to
use the test results, which claim the Court accepted. That being true,
it is hard to square the use of the word "solely" in reference to the
test scores of either the white or of either minority group of test
takers, especially since some members of all three racial groups were
affected positively and others were affected negatively by the decision
not to use the test results. The evidence the Court relied on showed
that the City acted with knowledge of the test scores of all of the test
takers, at least by their representation in the three different racial
discrimination under previous authority for proof of intent to discriminate. For a description of
the various ways of proving intent to discriminate to which the Ricci approach should be
added, see Zimmer, supra note 20.
26. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009).
27. Id. (emphasis added). It is, of course, true that the City acted because of the racial
consequences of using the test scores. That is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether it
acted because of the adverse racial consequences-i.e., "because of" the race of the seventeen
white and one Hispanic plaintiff.
28. The Court recognized that fact with its statement that the City acted because it
knew the "statistical disparity based on race-i.e., how minority candidates had performed
when compared to white candidates." Id. at 2673.
29. That is, after all, what disparate impact means.
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groups of test takers. Thus, the decision was "solely" because of the
known racial consequences of all the test takers.
Justice Kennedy does not explain how "because of race" was
linked solely to the race of this group of some of the white test takers,
when there were test takers from the two other racial groups who
were also adversely affected when the City decided not to use the
test scores. That these white test takers would be adversely affected
by the decision not to use the test results was clear but it would also
be clear for the higher scoring members of the two other racial
groups. The impact on all the lower scoring test takers who were
represented in all three racial groups was also clear: Their chance for
promotion improved to something better than no chance at all.
Putting all this together, the City was found to have acted with an
intent to discriminate against this particular set of test takers,
including the Ricci plaintiffs (and the one Hispanic who did not join
in the suit), "because of their race" where that finding is based
simply on the City's knowledge of the racial consequences of its
decision as to all the test takers.
Since the Court assumed there was no evidence of animus
against these particular white test takers (or anyone else), a "color-
blind" standard would support a finding that the City's decision
constituted disparate treatment of all of the test takers but would not
support a finding that the decision was "solely" because of the race
of one particular group of test takers-the higher scoring white test
takers. A possible way of interpreting the term "solely" here is that
the Court assumed that this subset of all the white test takers was the
only group adversely affected by the City's decision not to use the
test results .a
To put this into the context of the preexisting disparate
treatment law, Justice Kennedy may have used the "solely because"
language to bolster the Court's apparent finding as a matter of law
that this group satisfied the separate, "adverse employment action"
element of a disparate treatment case. 1 While a decision that was not
30. The opinion of Justice Kennedy exhibited such a strong empathy for the high
scoring white test takers that he may have been blinded to the actual fact that high scoring
members of the other two racial groups also were adversely affected by the decision not to use
the test scores. That a present majority of the Court is sensitive to the claims of whites, rather
than of minority groups, is a point strongly made by Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 4.
31. See Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[H]undreds if
not thousands of decisions say that an 'adverse employment action' is essential to the plaintiffs
prima facie case . . . .").
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"color-blind" would be "because of [the] race" of all those affected,
positively or negatively, only those who were adversely affected
would be able to challenge that decision. A problem with that
interpretation is what to do with one of the plaintiffs in Ricci who
was a Hispanic test taker disadvantaged in exactly the same way as
the group of white test takers who sued the City. Thus, unless the
term "white" was simply a misstatement because Justice Kennedy
overlooked the fact that one plaintiff was not white,32 so that the
term meant all the plaintiffs in this case, it is counterfactual to say
that the decision was made "solely because the higher scoring
candidates were white." The Hispanic plaintiff cannot be
differentiated from the other Ricci plaintiffs except as to his race.
This supports the finding that the challenged decision need not be
focused on the particular plaintiffs, or even the race of the particular
plaintiffs, if the decisionmaker knew the racial consequences of its
decision.
Even if the term "white" was mistakenly meant to include the
one Hispanic plaintiff or was a mistaken description of all of the
Ricci plaintiffs, that interpretation still cannot be squared with the
record in the case. The evidence referred to by Justice Kennedy
shows that there was another Hispanic who would have been
promoted if the tests were used but who did not join in the Ricci
lawsuit. While he was adversely affected by the City's decision in the
same way as the Ricci plaintiffs, was he somehow not within the
scope of the City's discrimination that the Court found against these
plaintiffs?
It might be possible to interpret the Court's statement indicating
that the City focused its intent to discriminate only on the white test
takers, and not on the rest of the group of high scorers in the other
two racial groups, without regard to who ended up suing. To say
that another way, perhaps the Court is suggesting that the City was
motivated to decide not to use the tests because of the high test
scores of some white test takers, even though there were other high
scorers in the other racial groups affected in the same way. That
would make the group who were the victims of the City's intent to
discriminate under-inclusive of all those who were disadvantaged by
32. Overlooking the fact that one plaintiff was an Hispanic is an example of the
extraordinary empathy exhibited by the Court's opinion focused on the white test takers who
got high scores.
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that decision. Proof of such unequal treatment would be classic
evidence of intent to discriminate in a disparate treatment case
brought under preexisting law.
The problem with that analysis is that there is no evidence to
support it. Justice Kennedy did not point to any evidence that the
City, out of all the test takers, picked just the white test takers who
scored high enough to be promoted if the test scores were used and
discriminated against them rather than the larger group of high
scoring test takers from all three racial groups who were adversely
affected. If there was evidence to support a finding that the City
intended to discriminate against only a subset of all those who scored
highly enough to be promotable, that would be inconsistent with
the Court's assumption that the City's decision was "well
intentioned or benevolent." But, there is no indication that such
evidence was in the record upon which the Court decided the case as
a matter of law.
Beyond the under-inclusion of the two Hispanic test takers who
would be promoted immediately if the test scores were used, there
were three African-American test takers who scored high enough
that they might be promoted over the life span of the test should
more lieutenant and captain positions open up. These African
Americans were not exactly in the same situation as the two Hispanic
and 17 white test takers who would be promoted to fill existing
openings, but they did lose some real chance to be promoted when
the City decided not to use the tests. There is no evidence that the
City had any intent to discriminate against them, even though they
were disadvantaged by the City's decision.
Finding that the City made its decision "solely because the
higher scoring candidates were white," without any evidence to
support that conclusion, is at odds with prior law. Until Ricci, a
finding of disparate treatment discrimination required that the
challenged decision was made because of its effect on the plaintiffs,
not despite it. In the context of equal protection law, the Court, in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,5 found that an
33. The concept of "under-inclusion"-the classification covered some but not all of
those who were similarly situated-is an equal protection concept. See Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 348-53 (1949).
34. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-101 (2003); McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
35. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). For a Title VII case finding no liability "because of" sex in
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absolute preference for hiring military veterans at a time when men
were 98% of the veterans was not intentional discrimination against
women even though almost all women were disqualified if even one
veteran applied for any particular job. The Feeney Court noted:
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent
as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies
that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature,
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group."
This is the opposite of what the Ricci Court did in finding the
City liable where it acted "in spite of' the race of the plaintiffs.
Although the City surely knew that deciding not to use the test
would disadvantage the white and Hispanic test takers who would be
promoted if the test were used, as well as the African-American test
takers who in the future might be promoted if the test results were
implemented, the evidence alluded to by Justice Kennedy appears to
only support the conclusion that the City made its decision to avoid
disparate impact liability to minority test takers "in spite of," rather
than "because of," its impact on any of the high test scorers of any
race.37
With no evidence of animus aimed at any individuals or at the
members of any racial group, the term "solely" is incoherent unless
what is meant by a decision being "because of race" was that it
violated a "color-blind" standard. If action taken "in spite of' its
impact on some members of all three racial groups suffices to
establish that the action was "because of race" of some members of
all three groups that only makes sense if the "color-blind" standard is
used. The "color-blind" standard appears to impose a flat
prohibition on an employer acting when it knows the race of those
affected, even if there is no proof that its action was intended to hurt
those adversely affected because of their race.
face of an extremely strong and unrebutted statistical showing of impact, see EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck &rCo., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1982).
36. Fenney, 442 U.S. at 279 (citations omitted).
37. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 207 ("It seems strange to view the city of New Haven
as canceling the test because it wanted to disadvantage the white firefighters, although New
Haven certainly knew that that would be the result. A better reading of the facts (or at least a
plausible one) is that New Haven acted to avoid disparate impact liability despite the 'adverse
effects upon and identifiable group' of whites." (citations omitted)).
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The Court further eased the proof requirements of a disparate
treatment case. Violating the Ricci "color-blind" standard appears to
establish disparate treatment liability even if there is an affirmative
finding that the motivation of the decisionmaker had nothing to do
with its adverse effect on the plaintiffs challenging the decision as
discriminatory. In Ricci, Justice Kennedy accepted, as a matter of
law, that the City's explanation for its action, which was to avoid
disparate impact liability to minority group members, was the actual
motivation for its decision not to use the results of the test for
promotion. But, if that explanation were true, there would be no
basis for concluding that the City's reason was "solely because the
higher scoring candidates were white." If the reason was "solely
because the higher scorers where white," it would be impossible to
also conclude that the City was motivated by a desire not to create
an adverse impact on the members of minority groups. Thus, there is
an apparent contradiction between the finding that the City's action
was motivated by a desire to avoid disparate impact liability against
minority test takers and the conclusion that the motivation for the
City's decision was "solely because the higher scoring candidates
were white" if the prior distinction between actions taken "because
of' versus "in spite of' still pertains.
All of this reinforces the new thrust of disparate treatment law:
Liability is established to those adversely affected if it is found that
the decisionmaker acted knowing the racial consequences of its
decision. That remains true even if there are affirmative findings that
the decisionmaker was motivated by some reason other than the
intent to discriminate against the plaintiff or against anyone else.
Liability attaches even in face of a finding that the motivation for the
decision was "well intentioned and benevolent" and was made "in
spite of" rather than "because of' its impact on the plaintiffs. All this
supports the conclusion that Ricci establishes a "color-blind"
standard of liability: Knowing the race of those affected by a decision
violates that standard and anyone adversely affected by that decision
can bring a Ricci-style disparate treatment claim.
Justice Alito, in his concurrence, which was joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, goes much further in unlinking disparate
treatment liability from any focus on the race of the individuals
38. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682-83 (2009). While accepting that
explanation as true, the Court, nevertheless, held it inadequate as a defense to plaintiffs'
disparate treatment claim.
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affected. He acknowledges that the City claimed that its motive was
to avoid disparate impact liability." He calls that the decision's
objective motivation, because that is the one the City announced in
public and relied on as a defense to this case.40 But he goes behind
that announced motive and argues that the City advanced this
disparate impact rationale as a pretext to hide its real reason, which
was that the mayor was bending to political pressure in the
community, particularly pressure brought by a politically powerful
African-American minister." In other words, the hidden, but actual
motivation was not an intent to discriminate against, or in favor of,
any of the test takers but was made for political reasons with the
result affecting all the test takers of all three racial groups, some
positively and some negatively. Nevertheless, for Justice Alito that
motive suffices to establish disparate treatment liability to adversely
affected test takers because the political pressure was tinged with
race.
If caving in to political pressure, even pressure that is racially
motivated by those exerting it, is the true motivation for the City's
decision, that would be, at least under preexisting law, a successful
rebuttal to the claim that the City acted "solely because the higher
scoring candidates were white" and would be a basis to deny
disparate treatment liability to all those adversely affected by the
decision. Justice Alito's reasoning in Ricci is at odds with Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins.42 There, the Court, in an age discrimination
case, held that an illegitimate, even unlawful, motivation to deny the
plaintiff his pension was not evidence relevant to proving age
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act.4 If pension discrimination was the sole motivation for the
employer's action, that meant for the Hazen Paper Court that there
was no evidence supporting finding discrimination "as a result of ...
age."" Based on the law established in Hazen Paper, Justice Alito's
argument would not be a basis for plaintiffs' disparate treatment
claim but would appear to provide a good defense for the City.
39. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2684 (Alito, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 2683-84.
41. Id. at 2683-88.
42. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
43. Id. at 612-13.
44. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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From the point of view of the preexisting law, the City's best
defense may have been to admit that the City gave in to political
pressure and that responding to that pressure was the sole motivation
for its decision not to use the test scores for promotions. If accepted
as true, that would undercut any basis for finding an intent to
discriminate "solely because the higher scoring candidates were
white" or because of the race of any of the test takers. It would have
taken the case outside of Title VII." Of course, decisions can be
motivated by more than one factor, but there was no evidence of a
factor other than racial politics and the subjective intent to not
disadvantage African American test takers. Whether or not what
Justice Alito claims was the motivation for the City's action is true,
his position does not support, but rather undermines, a finding that
the City acted with intent to discriminate against the Ricci plaintiffs,
assuming the preexisting law applied. The best interpretation of
Justice Alito's position is that a defendant commits disparate
treatment discrimination if race enters the decisionmaking process in
any way and the decision adversely affects anyone. This step-to
prohibit race from ever being considered for any reason if the
resulting action adversely affects anyone without regard to the race
of that person-although taken by only three members of the Court,
points out the extreme direction the Court appears to be taking
disparate treatment law under this newly minted "color-blind"
standard."
Even without Justice Alito's extreme position, the first three
statements of Justice Kennedy's opinion support the finding that
disparate treatment discrimination exists if an employer knows the
consequences, in terms of the racial groups affected, of an action that
it takes. This new "color-blind" standard of liability is bolstered by
the Court's rejection, sub silentio, of much of preexisting disparate
treatment doctrine that had constrained the scope of application of
disparate treatment law to adverse employment decisions that were
45. Ironically, the decision not to use the test scores might be vulnerable to attack as
disparate impact against the white test takers. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The World
Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1505
(2004).
46. Should Justice Alito's approach be extended to apply in equal protection cases, the
decisionmaking by virtually every governmental actor would be subject to challenge as
discrimination if the actor knew the racial consequences of its actions. That would potentially
cripple the ability to govern.
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based on an intent to discriminate and were "because of' and not
"in spite of' the race of those adversely affected.
4. [A]fter the tests were completed, the raw racial results
became the predominant rationale for the City's refusal to
certify the results.
While the first three statements are grouped near the beginning
of the legal analysis in the opinion, the last three come near the
conclusion when Justice Kennedy is summing up why the City's
action constituted disparate treatment. The fourth statement
reinforces the earlier conclusion that the decisive factual finding,
made as a matter of law, was that the City acted because it knew the
"raw racial results" of the test and what the use of those results
would mean in terms of promotions to lieutenant and captain. 48 But
the City knew and acted based on the results of the test for all three
racial groups-the promotion rates for African Americans and
Hispanics were too low, i.e., the test resulted in disparate impact,
compared to the higher scoring whites. But not all Hispanics,
African Americans, or, for that matter, all whites, scored either high
enough to be promotable or too low to be promoted. Acting on
such "raw racial results" triggered the finding that the decision was
because of race. However, the Court points to no evidence, other
than the City's knowledge of the racial consequences of the action it
took, that the City acted the way it did to discriminate against the
white test takers at all and especially because they were white. What
is true is that the City's action, which the Court found it had taken
to avoid disparate impact claims by minority group members, had an
inevitable effect on all the higher scoring test takers, including, but
not limited to, the white test takers.
Under the Ricci "color-blind" standard, simply knowing the
consequences of an employer's action is the harm to be prohibited
by disparate treatment law. If the goal of this standard is to expunge
any and all knowledge of race from governmental decision-making,
then the race of any of the people affected by any particular action is
not important. Where race is implicated because of the knowledge of
the decisionmaker, it is irrelevant whether the action is "because of'
47. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
48. Id.
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or "in spite of" the race of any affected individual: "color-blind"
means taking race out of the picture entirely.
While not an affirmative action case, Ricci does show that acting
benevolently to avoid disparate impact against the member of one
racial group inevitably affects the members of all the other racial
groups involved in the decision. More simply, reducing the negative
impact on the promotability of minority group members has an
inevitable consequence of increasing the negative impact on the
majority whenever there is competition among many for only a few
promotions or other benefits. The Court in Ricci finds that negative
impact to be disparate treatment against the members of the white
racial group, even if there was no intent to discriminate against them,
at least as that term had been used up until Ricci. Presumably,
actions that favor members of the white race and have negative
impact on minority group members will also trigger liability if the
decisionmaker knows that is the consequence of its actions. In other
words, an employer is liable whichever way the decision cuts, if the
decision is made when its racial consequence is known.
In sum, a "color-blind" standard prohibits decisions when the
actor knows the racial consequences of its actions on members of all
racial groups. With that "color-blind" standard, any person,
regardless of their race, can bring an action if she is adversely affected
by the employer's decision. This is a radical expansion in the scope of
application of disparate treatment law. Indeed, it makes every
employment decision vulnerable to disparate treatment attack simply
on the basis of a factual showing that the employer knew the racial
consequences of its action. The next two statements by the Court
explore whether or not this new "color-blind" standard is one of
general application or if any exceptions exist.
5. The injury arises in part from the high, and justified,
expectations of the candidates who had participated in the
testing process on the terms the City had established for the
promotional process. Many of the candidates had studied for
months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and
thus the injury caused by the City's reliance on raw racial
statistics at the end of the process was all the more severe."
49. Id.
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This statement raises the reliance interests or the expectations of
the test takers that the test results would be used to make
promotions. Although the Court appears to focus on the facts
supporting a finding of reliance interests by the Ricci plaintiffs, all of
the test takers from all three racial groups invested time, effort, and
money to prepare for the test. What is interesting is that the
statement of the role of this reliance factor does not seem to rise to
the level of an element of a Ricci "color-blind" disparate treatment
claim. Plaintiffs' reliance made the consequences of the City's
decision "all the more severe."so Thus, reliance may be a factor but is
not always necessary to make out a claim. The fact of plaintiffs'
reliance was only part of the injury resulting from the City's violation
of the "color-blind" standard thus adding to the severity of the
consequences. Based on that, it can be argued that injury would have
occurred even if there were no reliance interest established on the
part of the adversely affected firefighters. If the underlying harm that
is caused is the violation of the "color-blind" standard, then the
defeated expectation interest that the "color-blind" standard would
be used is important only because that shows who was adversely
affected by the action.
The scope of application of this Ricci "color-blind" standard will
depend significantly on whether this reliance aspect of the case
becomes an element that must be proved to establish a Ricci
disparate treatment claim. The alternative, as it appears from Justice
Kennedy's wording, is that reliance is only a factor that is used to
weigh the severity of the discrimination.5' If reasonable expectations
or reliance becomes a separate element needed to be proven to
establish Ricci disparate treatment discrimination, the Ricci "color-
blind" standard would likely be of more limited application. Suppose
that after Ricci, a city, in deciding how to promote firefighters to
lieutenant and captain, announced to the potential test takers that it
reserved the right to review the test scores before deciding to use
them. The stated reason for that reservation is to "ensure that all
groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to
50. Id.
51. Presumably, the severity issue would be relevant to the remedy issues of
compensatory and punitive damages. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) (allowing a
civil rights plaintiff to recover punitive damages against certain employers if the employer
engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or reckless indifference to the protected
rights).
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participate in the process by which promotions will be made."52
Similarly, post-Ricci, well-advised employers may well amend their
employment policy manuals to include a provision that, because of
its obligations under antidiscrimination laws and its desire "to
provide a fair opportunity for all individuals,"5 ' it reserves the right
to review the results of any employment practice if the use would
result in disparate impact on protected groups and to remedy that
impact if necessary. Announcements or policy manual statements
along those lines would potentially undermine any expectations that
the results of the implementation of any employment practice would
actually be used or be used in the form originally contemplated.
Any efforts, in terms of time, effort, and money, to establish a
basis for a reliance element would come up against the employer's
announced policy that it is not reasonable for the employees to have
any expectations based on what they do. Employees, having notice
of such a reservation, arguably lack any basis for a "legitimate
expectation not to be judged on the basis of race,"54 even in the
indirect sense that the actor knew the racial consequences of what
she was planning to do. Given the deference that the Court has
given employer promulgated policies, even in the context of
adhesion contracts,5 Ricci may be rendered of little effect, except as
a trap for unwary employers who are poorly advised, should reliance
morph into an element of a Ricci "color-blind" disparate treatment
claim.
It would be difficult to predict whether the Court's deference to
private ordering by employers would hold up in a case, like Ricci,
where the Court would have strong empathy for the plaintiffs.
Assuming facts just like Ricci but with a clear statement that those
taking the test should not have any expectation that its results would
be used for promotions, the Court would be faced with a collision of
52. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(discussing that an age discrimination claim under the ADEA is subject to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application). More
recently, the Court has abandoned even the need for the fig leaf of consent in adhesion
contracts and has forced employees into collective bargaining agreement arbitration to which
they gave no consent at all. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). See
generally Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn
Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825 (2010) (critiquing Pyett).
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two of its policies: one is the newly minted "color-blind" standard of
Ricci and the other would be its high deference to employer private
ordering of the employment setting.5 The race of those adversely
affected by a decision not to use the test scores may be very relevant
to the outcome.57 Justice Kennedy, for the majority, appeared to
emphasize the equities of the high scoring white firefighters.ss Justice
Ginsburg agreed that empathy toward the white test takers was
important but she also stressed the equities of the minority
firefighters who had long been victims of exclusion and
discrimination by the New Haven fire department.5 ' All the test
takers, without regard to their race or to how well they scored on the
test, had invested time, effort, and money preparing to take the test.
It would be highly ironic if racially selective empathy factored into
the application of what is supposed to be a "color-blind" standard.o
Even in absence of a disclaimer in an employment policy manual,
the instances in which employees might be found to have established
reliance interests may be limited. Although posting the scheduling of
a promotion test at least lets potential test takers know of the test
and makes "clear the[] selection criteria,, 6 1 employers quite
frequently undertake the implementation of employment practices
without notice of any kind to the potentially affected employees. In
56. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
57. This has led Primus to make an interesting argument: the context, particularly the
race of the plaintiffs, of the next disparate treatment case to get before the Supreme Court may
determine the scope of the Ricci "color-blind" standard. See Primus, supra note 4. If the next
case getting to the Court is brought by minority plaintiffs, Primus suggests that the Court
might stop short of clearly adopting a general "color blind" standard. But, he thinks, if the
case is brought by whites, the Court may take that step. This goes to the point raised by Harris
& West-Faulcon, supra note 4, that the Court has refocused discrimination law to protect
whites.
58. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
59. Id. at 2690-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 4. A backdrop is the role of the unconscious
in shaping the perceptions of everyone, Supreme Court Justices included. See generally Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). Recently this issue has
focused on the use of evidence of "implicit bias" by way of expert testimony. See generally
David L. Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2008); Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context:
Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FoRDHAM. L. REV.
37 (2009). For a broader context, see Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract
id=1529886.
61. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
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those situations, it would be difficult for an employee bringing a
Ricci "color-blind" case if she had to prove reliance as an element. A
good example would be promotions. Unlike civil service systems like
the one involved in Ricci, many, maybe most, employers undertake
to evaluate employees for purposes of making promotion decisions
without even announcing that that is what they are doing, much less
making clear the selection criteria that are being used.6 2 Another
example is hiring where criteria are frequently not set forth or not set
forth very clearly. If reliance is an element, it could be argued that
the affected employees in these situations lack any reliance basis that
might trigger the Ricci "color-blind" standard.
Perhaps the reason for the qualified language used by Justice
Kennedy to describe the role of the plaintiffs' reliance interests is that
the Court was bolstering its conclusion that these plaintiffs were
actually adversely affected by the decision not to use the test results.
Some courts find that only "ultimate" employment decisions, such as
discharges, satisfy the adverse employment action element of the
disparate treatment law preexisting Ricci." Deciding not to
implement the results of a promotion procedure would not satisfy
those courts. Justice Kennedy may have been responding to the
notion that nothing actually happened to these plaintiffs, at least
nothing sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action.
Where a more clear-cut impact resulted from the challenged
decision,' there would be no need to point out that the plaintiff had
established a reliance interest.
Finally, while the Court emphasized the reliance interests that
the Ricci plaintiffs had established by their long, hard, and expensive
preparation for the promotion test, the language Justice Kennedy
used to describe this interest did not turn on reliance interest in the
sense of the effort test takers took to prepare for the test. Instead,
there was a general statement of "an employee's legitimate
62. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), involves a class
action challenge to the promotion practices of the employer claiming that those practices were
unstructured and without clearly stated criteria which allowed supervisors to discriminate
consciously and unconsciously in making promotion decisions.
63. For an excellent analysis of the issue, see Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis
Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998).
64. See generally Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (discussing disparate impact
plaintiffs who were rejected from further participation in a hierarchical promotion system
because they failed the written test that they challenged).
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expectation not to be judged on the basis of race."" Given the
general prohibition of race discrimination in employment established
in Title VII and in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it can be argued that all
employees, all the time, have a legitimate expectation not to be
discriminated against in their employment on the basis of race. If
employees always have such an expectation, then reliance would not
be a separate element of a Ricci claim just as it is not an element of
any other theory of Title VII liability.
The development of this reliance issue will, in the future, be one
of the biggest variables in the ultimate scope of Ricci "color-blind"
disparate treatment claims of discrimination. The soft language used
in describing the issue suggests that it is not to be taken as too
significant of an issue. But that same soft language opens up a range
of discretion, the exercise of which may depend in fact on the
strength of the particular reliance interests that plaintiffs can prove or
the empathy they receive from a court.
6. Nor do we question an employer's affirmative efforts to
ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for
promotions and to participate in the process by which
promotions will be made. But once that process has been
established and employers have made clear their selection
criteria, they may not then invalidate the test results, thus
upsetting an employee's legitimate expectation not to be
judged on the basis of race. . .. Title VII does not prohibit
an employer from considering, before administering a test or
practice, how to design that test or practice in order to
provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of
their race.66
Unlike the ambiguity as to the role of reliance, this statement
does appear to establish a limit on the scope of application of the
Ricci "color-blind" standard of disparate treatment discrimination:
the employer may, during the initial design phase setting up a new
employment practice, investigate the potential consequences that its
use might produce, including its consequence in terms of race, in
65. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
66. Id.
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order to allow the employer to plan, in light of that knowledge, how
to provide a fair opportunity for everyone."
Justice Kennedy does not explicitly say that during the design
phase the employer is safe even though it knows the race of those
potentially affected. But he does say that the employer can design its
employer practices "in order to provide a fair opportunity for all
individuals, regardless of their race."" The relatively clear import of
what he said is that during the design phase of an employment
practice, the employer can know and take account of the racial
consequences of its ultimate use of that practice. Thus, the Court did
not "question an employer's affirmative efforts to ensure that all
groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to
participate in the process by which promotions will be made.""
Since employers are prohibited by Title VII from engaging in
disparate impact discrimination, one aspect of providing a fair
opportunity to all is to avoid unjustified disparate impact against the
members of any racial group, including, perhaps, whites.70
It appears to be Justice Kennedy's view that an employer does
not violate the "color-blind" standard if, before a practice is actually
used, the employer reviews the likely racial consequences of the
employment practice in order to shield itself from disparate impact
liability and to provide equal opportunity to everyone. Ex ante, it is,
67. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, appears not to accept the design phase
exception that the Court adopts:
To be sure, the disparate- impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas, but it is
not clear why that should provide a safe harbor. Would a private employer not be
guilty of unlawful discrimination if he refrained from establishing a racial hiring
quota but intentionally designed his hiring practices to achieve the same end? Surely
he would. Intentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step up the chain.
Government compulsion of such design would therefore seemingly violate equal
protection principles. Nor would it matter that Title VII requires consideration of
race on a wholesale, rather than retail, level.
Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring). For Justice Scalia, the design phase is no different for
purposes of disparate treatment liability because it is "just one step up the chain." Id. Further,
considering the racial consequences on all the racial groups involved violates Title VII because
it is "consideration of race on a wholesale, rather than retail, level." Id. Thus, Justice Scalia
would not accept the "visible-victims" interpretation of Ricci advanced by Richard Primus.
Primus, supra note 4, at 1369.
68. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (majority opinion).
69. Id.
70. Title VII protects everyone from race discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). For an argument that, to survive equal protection attack,
the disparate impact provisions of § 703(k) of Title VII have to apply to whites as well as
members of minority groups, see Sullivan, supra note 45.
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of course, not always clear whether the future use by an employer of
a particular practice will, or will not, result in disparate impact
discrimination. But, it appears that investigating the potential
impact, which requires that the employer know the racial groups that
would be subjected to the practice and predict the impact upon
them, does not trigger disparate treatment discrimination. Another
way of looking at why racial consequences may be investigated
during the design phase is not that this period is an exception to the
"color-blind" definition of the intent element of a disparate
treatment claim but instead it reflects that, at this stage, no one has
yet suffered an adverse employment action, a separate element in a
disparate treatment case."
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF A RICCI "COLOR-BLIND" STANDARD OF
DISPARATE TREATMENT
Where it applies, Ricci does seem to have tremendous potential
for changing the approach to proving intentional discrimination that
can work to the advantage of plaintiffs generally: A plaintiff can
establish disparate treatment liability simply by proving that (1) the
defendant knew the racial consequences of its decision-violating
"color-blindness" is equated with the traditional intent to
discriminate element; (2) it then made that decision in light of that
knowledge-making the decision "because of race"; and (3) the
plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action taken by the
defendant.
Proving that the defendant knew the racial consequences of its
action either satisfies the traditional intent to discriminate element,
or replaces it with an easy to prove factual question. Traditionally,
intent to discriminate has been the hardest element of a disparate
treatment case to prove. 2 In a Ricci "color-blind" case, that element
becomes simply a question of the defendant's knowledge, without
more, of the racial consequences of its potential action." Not only is
71. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 208.
72. For a description of the various ways of proving intent to discriminate to which the
Ricci approach should be added, see Zimmer, supra note 20.
73. Even under the newly announced and more stringent fact pleading requirement
announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), a plaintiff relying on a Ricci "color-
blind" claim would merely have to plead that the defendant knew her race when it made the
decision she is challenging as discriminatory. Pleading sufficient facts to support the intent to
discriminate element under preexisting law would appear to be much more difficult.
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plaintiff's burden of proving intent vastly simplified, "because of
race" is simply established by that knowledge followed by a decision
by the defendant. In other words, acting while knowing the racial
consequences of a decision equals acting "because of race."" The
Court's approach knocks out any need to focus on linking
defendant's intent to the plaintiff and her race. "Because of race" is
satisfied simply by the fact that the defendant knew the racial
consequences of the situation and then acted, even if the effect on
the plaintiff was "in spite of' her race, with no need to prove it was
"because of plaintiffs race."
Under prior law, the "because of" race element was used in the
sense that the defendant's intent had to be shown to be focused on
the race of the plaintiff. Now, acting "because of race" in the
abstract sense of knowing the consequences in terms of the race of
those affected, without any focus on the plaintiff or her race, suffices
to establish the second element of a Ricci case. The third element,
that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, may even
have been made easier for plaintiffs. While the Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the question, there is some authority among the lower
courts that only serious employment actions-some say "ultimate"
ones like discharge-are sufficiently adverse to sustain a disparate
treatment action.7 s In Ricci, nothing actually happened to the
plaintiffs when the City decided not to use the test scores. What they
lost was a promotional opportunity, which, presumably, would be
replaced with a different procedure that would likely give them
another opportunity to be promoted. In other words, it may be that
all they suffered was a delayed promotion or a lowered chance for
promotion.
74. In his separate concurnng opinion, which suggests that the disparate impact
provisions of antidiscrimination laws may violate equal protection, Justice Scalia appears to
confirm the case with which disparate treatment can be established: "Title VII's disparate-
impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the
racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial
outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory." Ricci,
129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Ricci, the City put "a racial thumb on the
scales" and evaluated the racial outcome if the test results were used. Acting on that knowledge
was disparate treatment discrimination that the Ricci plaintiffs could challenge because they
were adversely affected by it.
75. See Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2006), for a description of some
of the "adverse employment action" jurisprudence.
76. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 208.
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In other words, Ricci can be argued to have established disparate
treatment as a strict liability offense: Liability attaches by showing
the employer violated the "color-blind" standard by taking action
knowing the race of those affected, which action adversely affected
an employee or applicant. If the City in fact made its decision to
avoid disparate impact liability to minority test takers, as the Court
found as a matter of law, or, if that explanation was a pretext for a
decision to give in to community political pressure as argued by
Justice Alito," that would make no difference for finding liability
under this new "color-blind" standard. Since the harm is acting with
knowledge of the racial consequences, it makes no difference even if
there was not any focus on the white test takers who got high scores
on the test, on the Ricci plaintiffs, or on the two Hispanics and three
African Americans who were disadvantaged by the decision not to
use the test scores for promotion. If disparate treatment
discrimination is now based on strict liability, all of those issues that
have proved so daunting under preexisting disparate treatment law
are rendered irrelevant at least to the extent this new "color-blind"
standard applies.
While the role of a reliance or expectations factor is not clear,
there appears to be one exception to the scope of the Ricci "race-
blind" standard, and that is the narrow ground that during the
design phase of an employment practice an employer can investigate,
come to know and to act on its potential racial consequences.
Presumably, this is an affirmative defense to be proven by the
defendant. Up to that point, no one has been adversely affected.
Once the design phase of the employment practice is completed and
it is set in place, thereafter the knowledge of the racial consequences
is enough, by itself, to establish that the decision and the resulting
action was "because of race." Those who could show that they were
adversely affected by that decision-here the Ricci plaintiffs, among
others-would establish liability. While apparently not an element of
a Ricci "color-blind" disparate treatment claim, the fact that the
plaintiffs acted in reliance on the City's plan to use the test results for
promotions adds to the injury flowing from a decision that was made
"because of race."
In sum, the Court appears to have created a new, "color-blind"
standard of disparate treatment discrimination that imposes a prima
77. Only Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in Justice Alito's concurring opinion.
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facie case of strict liability on an employer who acted knowing the
race of those affected. The Court appears to have recognized two
defenses that would overcome the prima facie case: (1) if the use of
race took place during the design phase of an employment policy or
practice or (2) if there is a "strong basis in evidence" that the
defendant would be liable for disparate impact liability under Title
V". 7
8
V. ADDITIONAL NEW HAVEN FIREFIGHTER TESTING CASES
Two more cases, one pending in court and the other at the
E.E.O.C. administrative stage, have arisen because the City has now
implemented the test results to fill the existing lieutenant and captain
openings. 79 Trying to apply the new Ricci "color-blind" standard to
them may help to develop the architecture of this new disparate
treatment theory. One case that was already brought in federal court,
Briscoe v. City of New Haven,so was a disparate impact challenge to
the weight given to the written and oral portions of the test.
Plaintiff, an African-American firefighter who took the test at the
same time as the Ricci plaintiffs, claims that he would have been
promoted if the weighting formula had been modified because the
60/40 formula favoring the written over the oral component had a
disparate impact on African-Americans. He has now been adversely
affected because the City has used the test results for the available
promotions to lieutenant and captain positions. Further, he claims
that, based on prior experience using the same weighting formula,
78. Even though using the test results would result in a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination, the Court found that the City failed to satisfy the "strong basis in
evidence" defense to disparate treatment liability because the test satisfied the job-related and
consistent with business necessity defense in §703(k) and disparate impact plaintiffs would not
be able to show that there was an available alternative that the City had failed to use. Ricci,
129 S. Ct. at 2677-78.
79. See Daniel Schwartz, Wait, There's ANOTHER Firefighter Race Discrimination Case
in New Haven? (Yes, and the Conn. Supreme Court Just Ruled On It), CONN. EMP. L. BLOG,
Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2009/12/articles/decisions-and-
rulings/wait-theres-another- firefighter-race- discrimination-case-in-new-haven-yes-and- the
conn-supreme-court-just-ruled-on-it/.
80. No. 3:09-cv-1642, 2010 WL 2794212, at *8 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010) (case
dismissed because "the Supreme Court in Ricci specifically anticipated and explicitly foreclosed
subsequent disparate impact suits" against the City based on the test that was at issue in that
case). The order of the Supreme Court in Ricci is an example of the interference with the
proper discretion of district courts that is criticized as excessive judicial activism by Paul
Gewirtz, Supreme Court Press, N.Y. TIMES, Op-Ed, Tuesday, July 6, 2010, at A-19.
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the City knew, even before it decided to use a written test for
promotions, that this 60/40 weighting would result in a disparate
impact on minority group members. Nothing was done about the
weighting issue because it was a long-standing feature of the
collective bargaining agreement between the City and the
firefighters' union."
Briscoe's claim of impact is that, of the seventy-seven candidates
for the lieutenant position, he scored the highest on the oral part of
the exam, but that his overall score using the 60/40 weighting left
him twenty-fourth on the list and thus not eligible to be promoted.
His complaint alleges:
The City did not believe that the 60 percent weighting that it
required was job related, and it knew ... that the weighting would
have a disparate impact on African-American candidates: for
example, on the lieutenant exam immediately preceding the 2003
exam, the African-American candidates as a group performed
substantially better than the white candidates on the oral exam, but
they were scored much lower overall because of the 60 percent
weighting given to the written test.82
Briscoe raises some interesting questions. It appears that plaintiff
framed his approach in Briscoe to avoid any preclusive effect from
one rather obtuse sentence of Justice Kennedy's opinion dealing
with any subsequent disparate impact action arising from the test at
issue in Ricci. That sentence is in the second to last paragraph:
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact
suit, then in light of our holding today it should be clear that the
City would avoid disparate-impact liability based on the strong
basis in evidence that, had it not certified the results, it would have
been subject to disparate-treatment liability. 3
81. The fact that the City had a contractual obligation to the union to use the 60/40
weighting formula would not be a defense to a Title VII claim.
82. Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, 5, No. 3:09-cv-1642 (D. Conn.
filed October 15, 2009).
83. Ricci v. DeStafano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009). The district judge relied on this
sentence to dismiss Briscoe's suit, see supra note 78. For an extended discussion on the
meaning of this sentence for the future of disparate impact law, see Seiner & Gutman, supra
note 4.
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While his is a disparate impact case, the Briscoe claim is focused
on the time period before the test was administered, i.e., during the
design phase. In contrast, Ricci focused on the implementation of
the test and its results. The potential disparate impact of the
weighting formula was not at issue in Ricci." Why Justice Kennedy's
sentence is inscrutable is that, in Ricci, seventeen white and one
Hispanic plaintiffs ultimately prevailed by claiming that they were
victims of intentional disparate treatment discrimination when the
defendant decided not to use the results of its promotion procedure.
The City's defense was that using the test scores would cause a
disparate impact on minority test takers. But the African-American,
Hispanic, and white test takers who were benefited by the City's
decision not to use the test scores, including Briscoe, were not party
to Ricci. Generally, only parties to an action are bound by a
judgment in that action but, nevertheless, there is an argument that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for preclusion."s The
84. The only reference to the weighting issue in Justice Kennedy's opinion is as to the
question of whether the City had a strong basis in evidence that it would be liable for disparate
impact because minority group challengers to the implementation of the test would succeed in
proving, pursuant to § 703(k)(1)(A)(ii), that a different weighting formula was an alternative
employment practice and the "employer refuses to adopt [that] available alternative
employment practice." Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
85. In dismissing Briscoe, the court did not address the procedural issues involved;
rather, it simply did what the Supreme Court said to do: dismiss all other disparate impact
cases based on the Ricci test. See supra note 78. For a discussion of those procedural issues, see
Sullivan, supra note 4, at 213-214. The preclusion issue ultimately turns on the impact of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), which overruled
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). Ironically, Martin v. Wilks was another firefighters's
case, again involving white plaintiffs. The white firefighters were negatively affected by actions
taken by the City of Birmingham to implement a consent decree it had agreed to with the
N.A.A.C.P. that settled a discrimination claim by African-American firefighters. The actions of
the City that the white plaintiffs' challenged in Martin v. Wilks were those that benefited black
firefighters, which they claimed disadvantaged them. Because the white firefighters were not
party to the action leading to the consent decree nor to the decree itself, the Court found that
they were not precluded by that decree from bringing a discrimination action. But Martin v.
Wilks is no longer good law. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 249 (1994)
(recognizing that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled Martin).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §2000-e(n), provided two scenarios by
which these disparate impact plaintiffs might be barred. The first is whether they had "actual
notice of the proposed judgment" that "might adversely affect their interests" and they had a
"reasonable opportunity to present objections." Because the Supreme Court granted summary
judgment in Ricci, which was the first time the City lost, there was no opportunity for the
disparate impact plaintiffs to present their objections. But the question would be whether the
potential for adverse action resulting from the Ricci case as it was working its way up to the
Supreme Court should have clued them to the risk that their interests "might" be adversely
affected. In other words, a lot depends on the meaning given the word "might."
1292
HeinOnline  -- 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1292 2010
allegations in Briscoe's claim is that the events he is challenging all
occurred (1) before the test was finalized or administered; (2) before
any potential test takers had invested time, effort and money to
prepare for a test that had yet to be implemented in any way; (3)
before the consequences in terms of the scores of different racial
groups were known; and (4) before the City decided not to use the
test results because it knew the racial consequences of using or not
using the scores.16 If the "design" exception to the Ricci "color-
blind" standard is found to apply, then the fact that the City knew
the potential racial consequences in terms of the likelihood that the
60/40 weighting of the written and oral scores would produce a
disparate impact, would not amount to disparate treatment
discrimination." To the extent that reliance or expectation interests
are relevant, the City's determination of how the two aspects of the
test would be weighted occurred before any expectations had been
established by any of the firefighters who were interested in
attempting to be promoted. Thus, disparate impact law would seem
to apply in Briscoe in its traditional way." In other words, Briscoe is
Alternatively, the question would be whether the City, when defending against the
white plaintiffs' disparate treatment claim, had "adequately represented" the disparate impact
claims of these plaintiffs. The City tried to defend against a judgment on the disparate
treatment ground by relying on the potential disparate impact liability if it had used the test
scores. While disparate impact would in some sense be the same legal grounds whether it was
used offensively or defensively, it seems odd that the earlier legal actions of the party these
plaintiffs were now suing, the City, would be the basis for precluding their suit. It would seem
there are due process issues of allowing the fox to guard the chicken coop. The consequence of
the dismissal of the Briscoe case was that the fox apparently had done a good enough job
protecting the chickens, in this case, Briscoe and other minority firefighters now adversely
affected because the City made the promotions based on the test results have lost their chance
to challenge that implementation, at least on disparate impact grounds.
86. See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, No. 3:09-CV-1642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794212,
at *4 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010).
87. If the design phase exception to the Ricci "color-blind" standard does not apply, the
City could try to defend its action form attack in Briscoe's disparate impact claim by arguing
that the disparate impact provisions in § 703(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k), are
unconstitutional because they require an employer to know the racial consequences of its use
of employment practices with that knowledge the basis for a finding that equal protection has
been violated. See infra Part VI. It would be highly ironic if the City that tried to defend its
action in Ricci on disparate impact grounds would now turn around and challenge the
constitutionality of disparate impact law.
88. Ironically, by focusing his disparate impact claim on the design phase of the
promotions procedures to avoid the risk of preclusion, Briscoe may have lost a Ricci "color-
blind" claim of disparate treatment discrimination because such a claim does not apply to the
design phase of employment practices. As to his disparate impact claim, it would be held timely
because the implementation of a practice that has a disparate impact can be the basis for a new
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an example of the design phase exception to the Ricci "color-blind"
standard of disparate treatment discrimination.
There is another claim arising out of the test that produced
Ricci." That claim, by a number of African-American test takers who
took the Ricci test, is that the City's recent use of the test results to
promote firefighters to lieutenant and captain positions is disparate
treatment discrimination.90 By claiming disparate treatment
discrimination, such a claim appears to escape any preclusive effect,
at least any based on Justice Kennedy's rather obscure suggestion
that disparate impact actions flowing out of the Ricci facts might be
barred." Further, the Ricci "color-blind" approach to proving
disparate impact appears to apply rather readily. Based on the same
evidence relied on in Ricci, the six groups of test takers are the same.
All that has changed is that the valence has flipped: Those white,
Hispanic and African-American test takers who were advantaged by
the earlier decision of the City not to use the test scores, including
these claimants, are now adversely affected because they will not be
promoted during the life span of the test.
Since the test results have now been used, those with high scores
on the test-some of whom were plaintiffs in Ricci-have been
promoted. Assuming there is no new evidence of subjective intent to
discriminate because of the race of anyone, the question is whether
the City is liable for intentional disparate treatment because it has
now used the test scores for promotions knowing the racial
consequences of its action. The answer seems to be yes since all three
elements of the Ricci "color-blind" test of disparate treatment are
satisfied: (1) the defendant knew the racial consequences of its
decision, (2) it made the decision to use the test scores with that
knowledge thus making the decision "because of race," and (3) the
charge of discrimination. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
89. The Connecticut Employment Law Blog reported that African-American
firefighters, who took the test at issue in Ricci but did not score high enough to be promoted,
have now filed E.E.O.C. charges claiming disparate treatment and impact discrimination
because those test results have now been used. Daniel A. Schwartz, Black Firefighters Move to
Intervene in Ricci v. Destefano, CONN EMP. L. BLOG (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2009/1 1/articles/decisions-and-rulings/black-
firefighters-move-to-intervene-in-ricci-v-destefano.
90. These African-American plaintiffs also claim disparate impact discrimination.
91. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009). It may be, however, that the
lower courts will read the majority as telling them not to allow any further litigation over the
test challenged in Ricci.
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plaintiffs suffered adverse employment impact because they have not
been and will not be promoted. The fact that the adverse impact on
thcsc plaintiffs was "in spite of' and not "because of' their race
should make no more difference for these plaintiffs than it did for the
Ricci plaintiffs.
The City could try to shift its position to raise as a defense the
basis for its liability as asserted by Justice Alito in his concurrence:
That all of its decisions about the entire promotion process were
motivated by factors that had nothing to do with the race of any of
the plaintiffs. The argument would be that the decision not to use
the test was solely motivated by community political pressure put on
the mayor. Now, the City is solely motivated to act by its need to
implement the remedy for the Ricci plaintiffs.9 2 While the majority
did not address this issue, Justice Alito's concurrence rejects that as a
defense to a Ricci "color-blind" action. Acting with knowledge of
the racial consequences-violating the "color-blind" standard-is the
key element. It is irrelevant that the actual motivation was not aimed
at anyone affected by the action but was the result of things that had
nothing to do with the race of the employees subject to the decision.
That view is only the view of three of the five Justices in the Ricci
majority and so Ricci did not decide that issue but the City might
92. The City could try to defend its use of race by claiming that it was justified by a
compelling governmental interest to remedy its own discrimination. See United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). If successful, this defense would have the odd consequence of
privileging one group of victims of the City's disparate treatment-the Ricci plaintiffs who
were among the first group adversely affected by the City's violation of the "color-blind"
standard-over those later affected by a subsequent decision. This would also involve a
violation of the "color-blind" standard, by providing a remedy only to the first group affected
by the initial decision. What makes this seem odd is that it would leave it to the defendant to
decide which group would receive a remedy for its disparate treatment discrimination against
both groups.
If, in the first instance in Ricci, the City had decided to use the test scores for
promotions while knowing the racial consequences of that decision, those not promoted could
challenge that decision as disparate treatment discrimination. If successful, those plaintiffs
would be entitled to a remedy, even though implementing that remedy would entail another
action violating the "color-blind" standard. The Ricci plaintiffs, along with other test takers
with high enough scores to be promoted, would be promoted and those adversely affected by
the decision to use the test results would also be entitled to a remedy for the City's disparate
treatment discrimination.
If, as happened, the City decided not to use the test scores, it is liable to the Ricci
plaintiffs. That would shield the City from disparate treatment liability to those adversely
affected by that decision because the use of race to remedy disparate treatment to the Ricci
plaintiffs would be justified by the compelling governmental interest in remedying
discrimination.
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raise for this new defense. It would, however, be ironic if a court
would now accept as a defense for the City what three justices
viewed as a basis for its liability in Ricci.
Finally, the claim by these African-American test takers does not
seem to be within the design phase exception that the Court created
along with its new Ricci "color-blind" approach to disparate
treatment discrimination. Just like the plaintiffs in Ricci, these
plaintiffs are challenging an action the City took well after the design
phase of the employment practice was over. Further, even if reliance
would be construed to be an element of a Ricci "color-blind" case,
these plaintiffs had the same reliance and expectation interests as the
Ricci plaintiffs. They also had spent time, effort, and money
preparing to take the test in the first place and they had the same
"legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race."" If
the Ricci plaintiffs' expectations of not being judged on the basis of
race were defeated when the City decided not to use the tests to
avoid disparate impact liability, then these plaintiffs' expectations of
not being judged on the basis of race were also defeated now that
the City has decided to use the tests since the City knew the racial
consequences of using the test.94 Thus, Ricci's "color-blind"
standard applies and the City would seem to be liable under it.
VI. CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCATES USE OF THE RIccI "COLOR-BLIND"
STANDARD
If the Ricci "color-blind" standard applies to this new disparate
treatment case as it did in Ricci, this makes the City damned for
having decided, in the first instance, not to use the test scores
because it knew the racial consequences of that decision and damned
now for using the test results, again because it knew the racial
consequences of that decision." At first blush, that may seem unfair
or somehow wrong. Although Ricci is a substantial change in
antidiscrimination law, the damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't
outcome is exactly the way a "color-blind" standard appears to work:
93. Ricci, 129 S. Ct at 2677.
94. Unlike in Ricci, where the decision makers for the City did not know the test scores
of the individual test takers but only the consequences in terms of the three different racial
groups, when the City used the test results it did know the individual identity of the test takers,
including the racial group to which each belonged.
95. It is also possible that the City could be damned a third time by losing the Briscoe
disparate impact case.
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The violation simply is acting knowing the racial consequences of
that action.
How the "color-blind" standard works may be seen by looking
at the plurality part of Chief Justice Robert's opinion in the school
assignment case, Parents Involved, where he appeared to announce a
"color-blind" standard to be applied in all pupil assignment decision
making: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race." 96 This seems a slight variant
of simply describing the "color-blind" standard that Ricci has now
established as to the meaning of disparate treatment." Looking to
the outcome in Parents Involved, the reason that the section of Chief
Justice Robert's opinion is only a plurality opinion is that Justice
Kennedy did not agree to it. Thus, Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Parents Involved is the holding of the Court. Unlike the
absolute, across-the-board "color-blind" standard asserted by the
Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy provides an exception to the general
application of that standard that foreshadows the approach he takes
for the Court in Ricci. He makes the following point in Parents
Involved:
In the administration of public schools by the state and local
authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools
and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body,
one aspect of which is its racial composition. If school authorities
are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain
schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-
conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and
without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis
of a systematic, individual typing by race.98
Thus, in both Parents Involved and Ricci, race conscious decision
making does not constitute a violation either of equal protection or
disparate treatment law as long as that consciousness occurs during
the planning stage of school assignments or of employment
promotion procedures. Race consciousness, at least by itself, is not
96. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007).
97. For an argument that post-Ricci disparate treatment and equal protection standards
are the same, see Primus, supra note 4, at 1345-46.
98. 551 U.S. at 788-89 (citation omitted).
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prohibited early on, before identifiable individuals know that they are
affected.
Richard Primus calls this his "visible victims" reading of Ricci.99
Primus suggests that this may reflect an underlying equal protection
value and is not merely a compromise position of the Justice who
straddles the middle of a sharply divided Court. Primus argues that
"[e]qual protection aims to reduce the public salience of race. When
considering the constitutionality of a race-conscious intervention, it
is therefore useful to ask whether the measure will reduce or
exacerbate the racial divides within the American public.""co When
individuals know that they are likely to be affected by action taken
when the racial consequences are known, that, for Primus, increases
the salience of race. That exacerbates, rather than minimizes or
reduces, the racial divide in our society. Accordingly, the salience of
race is increased when students (and their parents) know that they
were individually assigned to one particular school rather than
another because of their race and that students of another race are
assigned to that first school rather than the second one because of
their race. Similarly, the salience of race increases when workers take
a promotion test but have their expectations for the use of the test
deflated when the test scores are not used because of the impact on
some other racial group.
To the extent this reduction of the salience of race rationale is
now the driving force of equal protection as well as disparate
treatment law, racial salience is increased, not reduced, when
members of different racial groups are affected by an action taken
with consciousness of the racial consequences."0 ' This helps explain
the Ricci "color-blind" standard as well as the design phase
exception that Justice Kennedy establishes to that standard. The
planning process used to decide where to build schools and how to
draw pupil assignment zones as well as the design phase of new
employment practices, such as promotion procedures, does not have
99. See Primus, supra note 4, at 1369.
100. Id. at 1371.
101. An interesting empirical question would be to measure the intensity of reaction to a
decision, for example, not to promote firefighters to lieutenant and captain positions because
of budgetary problems of the employer versus the reaction in a situation like Ricci. If the
reaction is markedly more intense in a Ricci-type scenario than in the budget crunch situation,
this would seem to support Primus' theory that race is a particularly hot issue. The question
then would be whether a "color-blind" standard in fact would reduce the salience of race.
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any individuals identified by their race who are affected by any action
that is taken at that time.
Once the schools are built and their assignment zones
established, the assignment of individual students to particular
schools will more likely be perceived as being because of the
assignment plan and not "because of the race" of individual students,
even though race entered into the planning process. Similarly, with a
promotion procedure, the design phase does not involve any
individualized treatment based on race and so there is a reduced risk
that race will be salient, even if the design takes into account
potential racial consequences. Once the procedure is set in place,
then those who are promoted expect to be promoted by the use of
the test results and will view attempts at that stage to ameliorate any
disparate impact to be race-based. Thus, at the individual pupil
assignment or the implementation of the promotion procedures
stages, a "color-blind" standard sets in to minimize the focus on
issues of race. At that point, members of all races have "legitimate
expectation[s] not to be judged on the basis of race" and so any
action based on knowledge of its racial consequences violates the
"color-blind" standard and makes the actor liable to anyone
adversely affected by the action.102
This may explain why in Ricci Justice Kennedy dropped the
preexisting requirement that, to prove disparate treatment
discrimination, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant's action
was "because of' and not merely "in spite of' plaintifPs race. "In
spite of' now suffices because the harm done by violating the "color-
blind" standard is that a decision was made that involved race, even
if that use of race does not involve any focus on the plaintiff or her
race. A "color-blind" standard prohibits the consideration of race
when an action is "because of' the race of anyone, or of race in the
abstract, not just because of the race of a particular person or group
of people. To evoke a description from a long gone era, plaintiffs
who have been adversely affected because a defendant acted knowing
the race of affected individuals become "private attorneys general"'0o
102. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).
103. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968) ("A Title II [of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964] suit is thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action
under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for
himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority."). Professor Kerri Stone describes Ricci as an expansion of
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entitled to challenge the violation of the Ricci "color-blind"
standard, even in absence of evidence that the defendant acted
because of their race.
For civil rights advocates, the establishment of the Ricci "color-
blind" standard makes disparate treatment cases easier to prove,
assuming the "color-blind" test is applied in a "color-blind" way.
The members of minority groups for whose protection the
antidiscrimination statutes were originally enacted should receive, if
not the same empathy, at least the same protection that the Ricci
plaintiffs ultimately received.o' Eliminating the need to prove more
than an employer's action with knowledge of the racial consequences
and having that showing suffice to establish that the action was
"because of race" streamlines disparate treatment actions
enormously. Applying a general "color-blind" standard-a plaintiff
need only show that the defendant acted with the knowledge even
"in spite of" her race-further simplifies disparate treatment cases for
all plaintiffs.
From the viewpoint of civil rights advocates, there is now a
basis-though only supported by a concurring opinion joined by
three Justices at the right end of the spectrum-for finding disparate
treatment discrimination even in face of a defendant's evidence that a
reason unrelated to the race of the plaintiffs, or of any of the
employees, was the actual motivation for the action."os All plaintiffs
"third party standing" and "transferred intent" doctrine in Title VII. Stone, supra note 4.
104. Professors Harris and West-Faulcon describe the consequences of Ricci as turning
antidiscrimination law on its head to protect whites and to make it more difficult for minority
group members to enforce their rights:
Although the holding in Ricci is not unambiguous, and in some respects the
unusual factual predicate may ultimately limit its reach, Ricci reflects a doctrinal
move towards converting efforts to rectify racial inequality into white racial injury.
Ricci facilitates this racial project in two distinct but interrelated ways: by whitening
discrimination-that is reframing anti-discrimination law's presumptions and
burdens to focus on disparate treatment of whites as the paradigmatic and ultimately
preferred claim, and by race-ing efforts to install fair selection measures-that is,
treating the use of job-related assessment tools that correct racial imbalance and
better measure merit as racially disparate treatment of whites.
Harris &West-Faulcon, supra note 4, at 10-11. The easy and quick leap the Court took to find
disparate treatment liability certainly supports their conclusion. Nevertheless, it is important for
civil rights advocates to take advantage of that to benefit, if possible, those groups for whom
the antidiscrimination statutes were originally adopted. It may be that Congress will address
Ricci in amendments to Title VII or a more comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 2010. But
pressure to do something may increase if Ricci can be seen as a radical expansion of the scope
of the antidiscrimination laws to the disadvantage of employers generally.
105. Such a holding would require a majority of the Court to accept Justice Alito's
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need to prove is that race was in some way implicated and they were
adversely affected when challenging a decision. Actual intent to
discriminate against the plaintiffs would be irrelevant because the
violation would be the failure to make "color-blind" decisions.
VII. THE POTENTIAL BROADER IMPACT OF RICCI
By leaping so easily to a finding that the City committed
disparate treatment discrimination as a matter of law, the Court
appears, at least potentially, to have revolutionized discrimination
law because the new "color-blind" approach makes a plaintiffs
burden so much easier. Assuming the Court meant what it said in
Ricci, employers now face tremendous challenges in complying with
this "color-blind" approach to what constitutes disparate treatment
discrimination. Up until now, an employer acting with knowledge of
the racial consequences of that action has not faced much risk of
liability based on that knowledge alone; much more was needed to
prove an action was "because of' the race of the plaintiff. Ricci
changes that. Knowing the racial consequences of an action now
violates this "color-blind" approach and anyone adversely affected by
that action could bring a challenge.
The thrust in the Court toward this "color-blind" standard has
taken place in cases where the actor has acted benevolently toward
members of minority groups. Those cases include affirmative action
cases,'0 6 a school assignment case,'0o and now, the Ricci case. Ricci
did not involve affirmative action favoring members of minority
groups but instead was a situation where the defendant acted to
avoid imposing an adverse impact on minority group members.'
The first big step that needs to be taken to complete the
revolution of disparate treatment law is for this new "color-blind"
approach to be applied in claims brought by members of minority
groups.' The second round of cases against the City of New Haven
approach that he set forth in his concurring opinion in Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
106. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (discussing affirmative action in higher education).
107. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
108. In that way it more nearly resembles Parents Involved in which the defendant school
districts acted on the racial identity of students in assigning them to schools in order to avoid
racial resegregation.
109. A more technical first question may be whether Ricci applies in both systemic and
individual disparate treatment cases. The Ricci Court speaks of disparate treatment in general
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may be a good indicator of whether that step will be taken. But
strategically, at least, there seems to be good reason for members of
groups protected by the enactment of antidiscrimination laws to
bring cases based on this new, simplified law of disparate treatment
discrimination. It would be the highest irony if the courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, were to reject a "color-blind" or
equal treatment approach to this new "color-blind" standard.'
Assuming this "color-blind" standard of disparate treatment
discrimination applies to claims of race discrimination by members of
minority groups as well as by whites, the next set of questions is
whether disparate treatment discrimination now includes "gender-
blind," "age-blind," and other such standards."' While Ricci is a
statutory interpretation case, the background equal protection issues,
raised but not decided, may influence the extent to which Ricci's
approach is extended to other discrimination issues.
Consciousness of race, gender, etc., is ubiquitous in our society.
Because of that, Ricci will put all employment decisions made
beyond the design phase of an employment policy at risk of being
challenged as discriminatory because the race or gender of those
involved are typically known to employers when they make those
decisions. Proving such consciousness is likely to be easy. All the
more that is needed is proof that someone is adversely affected by
the decision. Employers will likely have considerable difficulty
terms and Justice Kennedy does not cite to the iconic individual disparate treatment decision,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Justice Scalia in his concurrence
and Justice Ginsburg in her dissent do cite McDonnell Douglas, for what that is worth.
Certainly nothing in the opinion for the Court suggests that this "color-blind" standard is
limited to systemic cases or that it does not apply to individual disparate treatment cases.
110. In Bush v. Gore, the Rehnquist Court attempted to limit its holding to the particular
case without presumably any precedential effect: "Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents
many complexities." 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). Nothing in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Court in Ricci suggests that this decision is without precedential effect. Given the long term
push by the right wing of both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts to adopt a "color-blind"
standard of discrimination, it would be surprising if the Court would deny precedential effect
to Ricci. But the Court does do surprising things.
111. Given the requirements for employers to reasonably accommodate workers because
of the workers' religious beliefs and practices under Title VII, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j),
and because of their disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 102(b)(5), 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5), special issues may arise in imposing "religion- blind" or a "disability-
blind" rules. Given the specialized approach to defining an "individual with a disability," §
3(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12102, it may be that the entire area of disability discrimination would not
be affected by the extension of Ricci.
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complying with this "color-blind" standard. If the approach is
extended to other issues, such as gender, the risk of liability is greatly
cxpanded.
Some employers, symphony orchestras for example, have
adopted approaches to the selection of new orchestra members
where the candidates play behind a curtain so those making the
decision do not know anything about the race, sex, or age of those
auditioning. While such a "veil of ignorance"l 2 approach may work
for musical groups, it would seem more daunting in the general run
of employment decision-making. Recently some employers have
adopted procedures to try to insulate the ultimate decision maker
from whatever discriminatory influence that may have taken place at
lower levels."' Needing to remove all indications of race, gender,
etc., from such processes will make those attempts all the more
challenging if the employer is to be insulated from disparate
treatment liability.
There have already been calls for action by Congress to overturn
Ricci." Professor Sullivan suggests that Congress could overturn the
holding that employers would need a "strong basis in evidence" to
defend against a disparate treatment claim based on the "color-
blind" standard and return to an interpretation that there is no
conflict between employer compliance with the disparate treatment
prohibition and the disparate impact one."s Alternatively, the "good
faith" standard urged by the concurrence in Ricci might be
adopted." 6 If Ricci is taken seriously, employers would have the
112. See generally JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (introducing the concept
of a "veil of ignorance"). See also Jean D'Acquila, supra note 4 (highlighting the challenges
facing employers and their lawyers because of Ricci).
113. One circuit has held that an employer is only liable for discrimination if the actual
decision maker harbored the intent to discriminate, even if underlings who did discriminate
influenced the final decision. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277 (4th
Cir. 2004) (en banc). For the other circuits the question is whether that decisionmaker is in
fact fully insulated from the discrimination of those down the hierarchy, with that issue
described as a question whether the decisionmaker was in fact "the cat's paw" of the actual
discriminator. If so, the employer is liable even in absence of proof that the decisionmaker even
knew of the discriminatory actions that nevertheless influenced the decision. See generally
Stephen Befort & Alison Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat's Paw: Delineating the Scope of
Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383
(2009); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001).
114. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 4.
115. Id.at215.
116. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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greatest incentive to push for amendments to the discrimination laws
to eliminate the "color-blind" standard of liability established in
Ricci. It might be that a coalition made up of civil rights advocates,
employers and others interested in discrimination law could be
formed to propose amendments to Congress in much the same way
that a coalition of interested parties formed to seek the recent
amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008."
Whether or not the antidiscrimination statutes are amended to
somehow take account of and perhaps overturn Ricci, a potential
limitation is that the background constitutional question of equal
protection may then come to the forefront."8 In answering the
statutory question in favor of the plaintiffs in Ricci, the Court
avoided having to decide the constitutional question. "Our statutory
holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken
here in purported compliance with Title VII."" Justice Scalia,
however, says it is only a matter of time until the constitutional
question must be addressed: The "resolution of this dispute merely
postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront the
question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent
with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection? The question
is not an easy one."' 2 0
Justice Scalia does, however, lay out the constitutional issue in a
way that suggests that he would hold those provisions
unconstitutional: "Title VII's disparate-impact provisions place a
racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the
racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on
117. See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
325, 122 Stat. 3553.
118. As Ricci came to the Court, it did involve both statutory and constitutional equal
protection issues: "Petitioners raise a statutory claim, under the disparate-treatment prohibition
of Title VII, and a constitutional claim, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 129 S. Ct. at 2672.
119. 129 S. Ct. at 2676. The Court further emphasized that it was not reaching any
constitutional questions:
We also do not hold that meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would
satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future case. As we explain below, because
respondents have not met their burden under Title VII, we need not decide whether
a legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify discriminatory
treatment under the Constitution.
Id.
120. Id. at 2681-82.
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(because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decision
making is, as the Court explains, discriminatory."' 21 Putting "a racial
thumb on the scales" because employers evaluate the "racial
outcomes of their policies"-violating the "color-blind" standard-
may, according to Justice Scalia, amount to more than the statutory
violation the Court found in Ricci.'22 It could also be the basis for
finding that the disparate impact provision of § 703(k) of Title VII is
unconstitutional. Congress is prohibited from requiring by law the
violation of equal protection: "[I]f the Federal Government is
prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, then surely it is
also prohibited from enacting laws mandating that third parties-
e.g., employers, whether private, State, or municipal-discriminate
on the basis of race." 2 3
Justice Scalia's approach is premised on treating the "race-blind"
standard to be the same for equal protection as the Court found it to
be in defining disparate treatment under Tide VII. None of the
other justices joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, so it is not
clear that a majority of the Court would accept that equation.' 24 If
Justice Scalia is successful in persuading a majority of the Court that
the "race-blind" standard applies to equal protection, that would put
the disparate impact provisions of Title VII as well as any
amendments aimed at overturning Ricci in jeopardy: An employer
trying to avoid disparate impact liability would perforce be required
to know the racial consequences of the employment practice in
question and that knowledge would, when acted upon, violate the
"color-blind" standard.
Any employer, public or private, could challenge the power of
Congress to enact a law that was at odds with the equal protection
requirements that apply to the federal government. Assuming a
prima facie equal protection case, the question would become
whether the disparate impact provisions are justified by a compelling
governmental interest. Given the narrow range of interests found
compelling, 2 it is not likely that the Court would find that the
121. Id. at 2682.
122. See id.
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Professor Primus, however, concludes that disparate treatment and equal protection
now have the same "color-blind" standard. See Primus, supra note 4.
125. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
737-40 (3rd ed. 2006) (compelling governmental interests limited to remedying past
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disparate impact provisions of Title VII would constitute a
compelling interest. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg points out that
such an interpretation would be radical.'2 6 And so it would be,
especially if Congress had been persuaded by a broad coalition of
groups, including representatives of employers, to overturn Ricci.
Adopting such a "color-blind" standard for equal protection would
make all governmental actors vulnerable to attack for actions they
take in almost every sector of government.'2 7 That is what would
make the "color-blind" standard of equal protection, if applied in a
"color-blind" or equal treatment way, so radical.
It is possible, though very unlikely, that the Court could take
another, even more radical step. And that would be to extend the
"color-blind" standard of equal protection to courts.' 28 Judges
inevitably need to know the race of the parties to an equal protection
claim. If the "color-blind" standard applies to courts, then the action
of a court deciding a case while knowing the racial consequences of
the decision would violate equal protection. That would mean that
the equal protection clause would become essentially unenforceable.
In other words, the strict scrutiny and compelling governmental
interest approach to equal protection that originated in Korematsu v.
United State'29 would be superseded. Instead, the equal protection
clause would become unenforceable, just as the privilege or
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was rendered a
nullity in the Slaughter House Cases.' Such a result would be the
discrimination and enhancing educational diversity).
126. 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. The governing bodies of every community, every school board or public institution
and every state with a racially diverse population will know the racial consequences of the
actions taken. That makes their decision vulnerable to equal protection attack by anyone
adversely affected by that action.
128. Even with Chief Justice Robert's expansive call for a "color-blind" standard for
assigning students to schools in the plurality part of his opinion in Parents Involved, he did
appear to accept the concept of strict scrutiny that could be met with proof of a compelling
governmental interest. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 720-22 (2007). Justice Kennedy, in Ricci, also looked to the law involving compelling
governmental interests when he was creating the new "strong basis in evidence" defense to a
disparate treatment claim. 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
129. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
130. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). It would be truly ironic if the equal protection clause was
rendered unenforceable because the Supreme Court imposed a "color-blind" standard on itself
along with all other governmental actors at a time when the privilege or immunities clause may
be taking on new life in the context of the Second Amendment. See McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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final irony because it would mean that the courts would lack the
capacity to decide cases such as Ricci. And that means that plaintiffs,
like the Ricci plaintiffs, would be denied any remedy for the
disparate treatment by their employers."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The obvious empathy for the plaintiffs expressed by Justice
Kennedy in his opinion in Ricci resulted in the Court's creation of a
radical new standard of disparate treatment liability. The Court easily
leaped over preexisting law to reach the conclusion that, as a matter
of law, these plaintiffs were the victims of disparate treatment
discrimination. While most of the Court's opinion dealt with
disparate impact law and the interrelationship between disparate
treatment and disparate impact law, the ease with which it found
disparate treatment may have the ironic effect of opening new
avenues for civil rights advocates to more easily and therefore more
successfully bring disparate treatment actions. That this result may be
an unintended consequence of the Court's solicitude for these
particular plaintiffs in Ricci should not forestall every effort to turn
the tide of antidiscrimination litigation back toward a more
empathetic treatment of those for whom the legislation was enacted
to protect.' 32
131. This does not mean that the employers did not violate equal protection. But it does
mean that no governmental actor, including the courts, could do anything about the violation.
132. See Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REv. 575
(2003).
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